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Abstract 
This note discusses whether the inflation process in Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain - countries that after the 
launch of the euro experienced national inflation rates above the weighted average of the EMU- has different time 
series properties from the EMU average and explains the possible implications of inflation differentials for the union 
and the national governments of member-countries. We find that the inflation differentials in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain are a long-run phenomenon which leads to a continuous real exchange appreciation. We interpret this as 
evidence for the debt problems that have arisen over the last two years in euro area.
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1. Introduction
It has been eleven years since the beginning of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the
introductionoftheeuro. Afterasharpconvergenceoftheinﬂationratesofthecountriesinitially
participating in the monetary union during the nineties national inﬂation rates started diverging
again. Although the European Central Bank (ECB) has done relatively well in relation to price
stability in the monetary union as a whole, national inﬂation rates in some member-countries
are well above the 2% objective of the monetary authority (Honohan & Lane 2003).
In currency areas the phenomenon of inﬂation divergences among regions is not unusual. When
thepossibilityoftheexchangerateadjustmentisnotpossibleandlabormobilityislow, inﬂation
differentials play a key role to the absorption of idiosyncratic shocks. So, inﬂation divergence
is a common characteristic of monetary unions even for the case of US where the heterogeneity
among states is much less compared to that of the EMU. Moreover, it is easy to understand that
inﬂation differentials can persist for some time and this can be due to various reasons. This
can be due to (i) Balassa-Samuelson effect (ii) differences in business cycles (iii) idiosyncratic
shocks and asymmetric adjustment mechanisms to euro area wide shocks (iv) structural dif-
ferences in labor and product market and (v) different degree of rigidities in prices and wages
(DeHaan 2010).
This note discusses whether the inﬂation process in Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain - coun-
tries that after the launch of the euro experienced national inﬂation rates above the weighted
average of the union - has different time series properties from the EMU average and explains
the possible implications of inﬂation differentials for the EMU and the national governments
of member-countries. For this reason, it is important to obtain some support from the data. To
this extent, we present those stylized facts that justify the claim that the inﬂation characteris-
tics in these countries differ from those in the other countries of the euro area. The existence
of long-run inﬂation differentials questions the effectiveness of the common monetary policy
instrument to stabilize inﬂation expectations. Higher inﬂation expectations imply lower real
– short and long-run – interest rates and deterioration of the terms of trade through reduced
competitiveness, characteristics that should not persist over long periods of time since they cre-
ate imbalances among the EMU members and could possibly lead to the destabilization of the
union.
2. Motivation
Turning to the behavior of inﬂation in recent years, from the beginning of the euro and after,
Figure 1 depicts the annual inﬂation differentials vis-a-vis the euro area for a subset of euro
area countries. We can observe that positive inﬂation differentials were apparent from the very
beginning of the EMU for Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal while at the same time Germany
appeared to have inﬂation rates lower than the average of the currency as a whole. It can be
clearly seen that inﬂation divergence was apparent from the very ﬁrst years of the union. While
it was declining during mid 2000s it started rising again into unprecedented levels.
A crucial issue for inﬂation divergence in a monetary union that must concern policy makers
is whether these differentials constitute a part of the natural process of convergence between
the member countries - a ”catch-up” mechanism from different initial conditions at price levels
- or are a permanent phenomenon which may manifest a clear separation between countries
that have persistently inﬂation rates above the average of the monetary union and countries
that are near or below this average. If this is the case, then the ﬁrst cluster of countries may
develop serious problems of deterioration in their balance of payments, loss of competitiveness
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Figure 1: Inﬂation Differentials















and large external debt; problems that cannot be allowed to persist for too long. Countries that
exhibit such characteristics would normally resort to the solution of devaluating their currency.
However, in the case of a monetary union things are different as the devaluation of the currency
is not possible anymore.
A univariate autoregressive of order one model is used to examine whether the inﬂation differ-








t are the national inﬂation rate and the average inﬂation rate of EMU respec-
tively and wt is white noise normally distributed with zero mean and one standard deviation.
Time series evidences seem to suggest that inﬂation differentials in Greece, Portugal and Spain
are permanently different from zero, explaining partly why these countries are currently facing
a debt crisis. In the case of Ireland the hypothesis that inﬂation differentials dissipate over long
periods of time seems to get signiﬁcant support from the data. The hypothesis of no long-run












c = 0 (3)
This model has been estimated using Bayesian inference and the ﬁrst prior moments regarding
c and g are motivated by the hypothesis that (pi
t  pEMU
t ) is a white noise process, meaning that
c = 0 and g = 0. The model can be reexpressed in the following format
pi
t  pEMU












. I assume independent normal and inverse gamma
prior distributions for b and s, respectively, and their posterior distribution is estimated using
the Gibbs sampler (see Koop 2003, for a detailed discussion). The data are taken from EURO-
STAT database and the measure used here for inﬂation rate is the HCPI in a quarterly frequency.
The sample-period for this estimation is between 1998Q2 and 2010Q3.
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3. Time Series Evidence
Figure 2 illustrates the posterior distribution of c
1 g for Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and
Germany, while the mode of this distribution is given by Table I. Both quantities have been
calculated using a non-parametric kernel density estimator (see Canova 2005, for a detailed
discussion). The results are quite revealing, as it can be seen – both from Figure 2 and Table
Figure 2: Posterior Unconditional Mean Distribution







Posterior Mean Inflation Differential: Greece







Posterior Mean Inflation Differential: Portugal





Posterior Mean Inflation Differential: Ireland










Posterior Mean Inflation Differential: Spain









Posterior Mean Inflation Differential: Germany
I – inﬂation differentials are not only non-zero in the long-run but also the hypothesis that
E(pi
t  pEMU
t ) = 0 gets almost zero support in all countries– with an exception of Ireland.
Table I illustrates that the nominal trend heterogeneity among EMU members is vast. For
instance, in Greece inﬂation is on average 1:3% higher than the EMU one, while in Germany
the CPI index grows by 0:5% less than the average EMU one. In order to fully appreciate the
implications of having different nominal trends in a common currency area let us consider the
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Table I: Long-Run Quarterly Inﬂation Differentials
Countries Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Germany
Posterior Mode 1.330% 0.510% 0.615% 0.873% -0.457%
following Uncovered Real Interest Rate Parity (URIRP) condition (see Gali & Monacelli 2005,








t are the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate in country i, rEMU
t and pEMU
t
are the respective variables for the currency as a whole and qt is the real exchange rate for
country i. The nominal interest rate in a monetary union is common for all the countries –
unique monetary policy instrument, ri
t = rEMU




The steady-state version of this equation implies




that the real exchange rate – level – is non stationary.
From equation (7) we can clearly see that a simple but valid way of measuring the competitive-
ness in a member country relatively to the rest of the monetary union is the inﬂation differential.
It is well known that one of the most serious problems for the member-countries of the south
Europe after the introduction of the euro is the continuous loss of competitiveness. This is clear
from the assessments on their competitiveness by international organizations i.e. according to
the World Economic Forum rankings of the EU27 in the global competitiveness index 2010-
2011 , Greece is 27th while Spain and Portugal although ranking higher also seem to loose
competitiveness every year.
4. Policy Implications
The previous section illustrates that long-term inﬂation differentials lead to a continuous real
exchange rate appreciation. If labor productivity does not rise signiﬁcantly to offset the loss
in competitiveness caused by the exchange rate appreciation, then large imbalances – excess
borrowing – are built up and they have to be confronted by adopting austerity measures and
rescue packages.
The question that immediately arises is why these inﬂation differentials actually exist in the
ﬁrst place. The signiﬁcant degree of heterogeneity – both in labor and ﬁnancial markets –
among EMU members reduces substantially the effectiveness of the common monetary policy
instrument (Angeloni & Ehrmann 2007) when EMU countries do not commit to the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) (Uhlig 2002).
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– pEMU
t – back to its target – pEMU – and to close the aggregate output gap yEMU
t (see for
instance Smets & Wouters 2007). As we can see from the above equation the policy maker
reacts to aggregate and not to individual country’s measures. This implies that if, say, inﬂation
in Greece is well above the target and inﬂation in the rest sixteen members is below pEMU then
the ECB must decrease the interest rate to bring pEMU
t back to the target, meaning even higher
inﬂation in Greece. The mechanism is as follows: higher inﬂation implies lower real interest
rate and this further means that long-term interest rate is also lower. This boosts consumption
and investment – approximately 80% of the demand – and higher demand puts further pressures
on inﬂation. It should be highlighted that the high real exchange rate lowers import inﬂation
and, consequently, CPI inﬂation. However, this is a small component of the later index and this
decrease is not strong enough to offset the rise in the domestic inﬂation.
This higher demand, which is accommodated by the absence of the monetary authority’s reac-
tion, is usually ﬁnanced by debt – either private or public. This, clearly, cannot be sustainable
and the recent debt crisis in the EMU revealed exactly this problem. Someone can argue that
the recent downgrades of the Greek, Irish and Portuguese government bonds reveals exactly
the above effect of inﬂation differentials. To be more speciﬁc, the replacement of the national
currencies by the euro is only a currency change that cannot eliminate the systemic risk caused
by persistent and chronic structural problems which are mainly reﬂected on the ”twin deﬁcits”
i.e. the public and current account deﬁcits, and this systemic risk is now embedded in nominal
bond yield. The introduction of the euro expunged not only the exchange risk uncertainty but
also the possibility of correction of macroeconomic imbalances such as loss of competitiveness,
through a de facto devaluation of the exchange rate. Before the creation of the EMU, when a
country faced a deterioration in the deﬁcit of the current account the devaluation of the national
currency seemed to be the best and less controversial solution. Moreover, the euro appeared to
provide a shield of protection for those countries that had experienced not only many but also
severe devaluations in the past. But, there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch,and this is the
case with the common currency which means that the markets are now focusing on the budget
deﬁcit and government debt and require higher costs of borrowing in the country by increasing
spreads, an aspect which often follows the deterioration of credit capacity. In other words, the
risk of a currency devaluation in the past, is now the risk of a downgrade of government bonds.
The crucial question is what has to be done in the near future to avoid similar situations of
ﬁscal crises in the euro area. There is a consensus among academics and policy makers that
there is an imperative need for improvement in SGP (Schalck 2006, 2011). According to some
proposals a combination of the re-enforcement of SGP – being part of each country’s constitu-
tion – and the implementation of structural reforms seems to be indispensable. These reforms
should be aimed at the creation of more ﬂexible markets and the improvement of the production
factors, with the objective of increasing the growth rate of productivity and the potential output
of the economy. These would be adequate and sufﬁcient conditions for putting all member-
countries in the same trajectory of growth and phenomena of asymmetries between them would
be only temporary.The structural reforms, with an emphasis on micro-reforms will make the
economies who suffer from low competitiveness more ﬂexible in dealing with negative shocks
i.e. less vulnerable to various shocks that can come from either the demand or the supply side.
Such reforms are of particular importance especially for countries like Greece, where persistent
inﬂation differentials led to a continued weakening of competitiveness, which has been a root
cause of macroeconomic instability since 2009. With respect to the re-enforcement of SGP,
ﬁscal discipline in a monetary union is of primary concern for eliminating inﬂation differen-
tials. This has to do with the role of expectations about further increase of inﬂation differentials
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within the eurozone. Through the mechanism of inﬂation expectations, persistent large ﬁscal
deﬁcits give a signal to the markets that relative production costs will increase in the future and
the markets discount this by forming higher inﬂation expectations today which decreases prices
for government bonds. On the other hand, there are those who argue that policy makers should
take into account the heterogeneity among member countries and increasing the ﬂexibility of
SGP would be a change towards the right direction for the future of EMU. Fiscal coordination
is compatible with the SGP and moreover by increasing the ﬂexibility of policies EMU can
avoid situations where strict policies can harm further the growth of the countries that are in
bad ﬁscal position.
5. Conclusions
This note tries to provide some explanation to the debt crisis in euro area. From the beginning
of the common monetary policy inﬂation differentials were apparent among member-countries
in EMU and according to the time series evidence we have so far, this divergence seems to be
a long-run phenomenon for Greece, Portugal and Spain. The continuous real exchange rate
appreciation of the countries of south Europe has led to a signiﬁcant loss of competitiveness
and the creation of persistent current account deﬁcits. The evidence does not show that inﬂation
differentials will be eliminated in the near future, something that poses numerous doubts about
the future of the euro area without major changes in the current framework especially in terms
of ﬁscal rules. The creation of a new framework for national ﬁscal policies seems to be more
urgent than ever before.
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